Gaza Herald – Ron Tira, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), published a critical review of how Israel has managed its war since October 2023. The study questions whether the state knew from the outset what it wanted to achieve, how to reach those goals, with which resources, and within what timeframe.
Tira argues that war is not managed through military operations alone but through the interconnection of three main elements: objectives, methods of achievement, and necessary resources. If the final goal is not clear and achievable, success in military operations does not necessarily guarantee a strategic result.
In Gaza, the Israeli government set goals including overthrowing Hamas rule, dismantling its military capabilities, and creating conditions for hostage recovery. However, these goals did not evolve into a comprehensive vision for the day after. Overthrowing Hamas authority raises immediate questions about who will govern Gaza next and how a system capable of managing the population and security can be built.
Without clear answers, military control over key areas became temporary, followed by withdrawals and repeated military operations. The study criticizes this “evolving dynamic” pattern of decision-making, noting that while flexibility is required, long-term war cannot be managed without defining the goal, resources, duration, and desired outcome.
The study highlights time as a strategic resource that Israel failed to manage effectively. As a small state dependent on short wars, Israel faced increasing military, economic, political, and diplomatic drain. Time ceased to be neutral and became a pressure factor affecting international relations, the economy, and domestic legitimacy.
Regarding Iran, the confrontation evolved gradually from reciprocal operations to direct clashes before expanding further. Tira asks what political result was expected from military strikes and whether a diplomatic path was prepared to leverage military outcomes for long-term goals. A military strike is not a strategy in itself; strategy begins with defining the desired post-strike situation.
In Lebanon, the study points to the absence of an Israeli “theory of victory.” Israel moved from containing escalation to broader operations and direct military confrontation without clearly defining whether the goal was weakening Hezbollah, changing its behavior, or imposing a new security reality on the border.
The study concludes that Israel entered the war focusing on Gaza but found itself facing a multi-front conflict. Resources were depleted without stable results emerging in several theaters. The crisis exposed a deep gap between military surplus and the inability of political and military leadership to convert force into clear policy and achievable objectives.
This report was produced in the Gaza Herald newsroom.
