Gaza Herald – Official documents published by the Hebrew newspaper Haaretz reveal that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued political directives in the years preceding the October 7, 2023 attack. These instructions mandated avoiding direct confrontation with Hamas, maintaining its rule in the Gaza Strip, and treating the territory as a secondary arena in Israel’s security calculations.
The investigation, conducted by Ronen Bergman and Yuval Rubovitch, utilizes documents prepared within Netanyahu’s office and submitted to the State Comptroller. These records contradict the Prime Minister’s narrative, which blamed military and intelligence leadership for failures and accused them of concealing information regarding Hamas’s capabilities.
According to the report, the policy of delaying confrontation was not merely an assessment by security agencies but a documented political direction from the Prime Minister’s Office and the National Security Council. This occurred despite warnings about Hamas’s growing strength and multi-front threats.
In July 2023, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar submitted a document warning that Hamas was consolidating control and developing capabilities. Bar proposed restoring deterrence through proactive military rounds and targeted assassinations. Netanyahu returned the document days later, writing by hand that setting national strategy is not the responsibility of the Shin Bet head.
A formal document drafted in response to a draft State Comptroller report in April 2024 outlined previous political directives. These included delaying confrontations, relying on border barriers, executing intermittent military strikes, and keeping Hamas as a governing entity capable of controlling conditions in Gaza.
One document dating back to April 2019 contained Netanyahu’s instructions to maintain Gaza as a secondary arena, avoid escalation as much as possible, and postpone confrontation with Hamas. In May 2020, a call repeated to keep the movement as a disciplined governing force capable of managing affairs.
A July 2023 National Security Council document indicated that the political approach relied on maintaining calm for long periods and keeping the sector as a secondary arena. The investigation states this policy influenced the IDF’s operational doctrine, avoiding decisive confrontation and seeking alternatives to clear military victory.
The State Comptroller noted that the lack of a comprehensive national security vision affected political and military decisions. Israeli deterrence suffered continuous erosion due to failure to respond to certain developments or impose costs on actions considered by the security establishment as restrictions on freedom of operation across borders.
The investigation highlighted shifts in Israeli military doctrine, moving away from traditional military decisiveness and offensive ground maneuvers toward reliance on technology, precise intelligence, and border obstacles. This trend was evident in the Tnuva plan, implemented late in 2020 under former Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi.
The Tnuva plan focused on technological superiority and intelligence while reducing traditional ground forces and tank numbers. Netanyahu expressed reservations about the plan during a presentation to the Security Cabinet in November 2020, warning it did not provide adequate responses to strategic objectives.
Documents prepared by the National Security Council later warned of a gap between political directives and the military plan’s principles, calling for discussion before approval. Meetings scheduled for December 2020 and January 2021 to address these gaps were not held.
In February 2021, a large military procurement deal using foreign aid funds was approved without comprehensive discussion on military strength-building alternatives or long-term security visions. The army continued implementing the plan, including reducing ground forces and tanks.
Netanyahu’s office later described these choices in its response to the State Comptroller as a dangerous gamble that cost the state dearly. The investigation claims Netanyahu and his aides worked on three parallel tracks after October 7 to solidify a narrative blaming military and security leadership.
The first track involved preventing the formation of an independent official inquiry committee. The second aimed to control the documentary record of events, limiting access to documents and questioning certain transcripts. The third involved accusing security chiefs of negligence and hesitation.
Many senior security officials who assumed their positions during the attack resigned and called for an official inquiry. Netanyahu did not assume political responsibility for the failure. The investigation also addressed disputes over intelligence available on the night of the attack.
Information reached the National Security Council operations center and the Prime Minister’s intelligence officer via standard procedures but did not reach Netanyahu directly. He did not order an internal investigation to determine why he was not informed or why his military secretary, Major General Avi Gil, was not awakened.
Netanyahu’s office accused former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar of failing to contact the Prime Minister directly, warn of the attack, or alert field forces. However, the investigation notes that communications between Bar, former Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, and Military Intelligence Head Aharon Haliva concluded that war was unlikely.
This report was produced in the Gaza Herald newsroom.
